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DEFINING THE PROTECTED GROUPS IN THE LAW OF GENOCIDE: LEARNING 









April 6, 2009, marked the fifteenth anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan 
Genocide.  In 1994, international outcry was not immediately forthcoming, but the 
commitment made by the United Nations Security Council for an international criminal 
tribunal to bring those who were responsible for the genocide to justice was an 
important statement condemning the actions of many Rwandans.  The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) had many legal issues to face, but the most 
important, by far, was an exploration of the law of genocide at international law.  The 
ICTR was the first international court to try an individual for genocide, and it has 
continued with an unprecedented number of genocide charges.  
 
Jean-Paul Sartre argued that “[genocide] itself is as old as humanity.”1  The 
international law that prohibits genocide, though, is only sixty-one years old.  It took 
fifty of those years before an individual was found guilty under the relatively young 
international law.2  The contributions of the ICTR to developments in the law of 
genocide are unquestionably significant.  And while judicial decisions are considered a 
subsidiary means for determining rules of international law,3 they are essential to any 
understanding the law’s application.   
 
                                                 
* Alison Hopkins, B.A. (UVic), LL.B. (Dalhousie), is an articling student with Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP in Ottawa.  This 
paper was awarded the Ronald St. John MacDonald Young Scholar’s Award by the Canadian Council on International Law in 
October 2009. 
 
1 Jean Paul Sartre, Statement “On Genocide” at the Second Session of the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal on 
Vietnam, (November 1967).  
2 See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber 1), online: ICTR <http://ictr.org> [Akayesu].  
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(d). 
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Genocide has been described as “the crime of crimes.”4  “Attacks on groups defined on 
the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity and religion have been elevated […] to the apex 
of human rights atrocities”5 through international law.  This elevated status exists 
because of the special intent required for an individual to be responsible for the 
commission of genocide.  The legal analysis of this “special intent” is one of the most 
important aspects of all ICTR jurisprudence.  Concern arose early within the ICTR that 
the Tutsi of Rwanda did not constitute a “protected group” under the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.  Determining what did constitute a “protected group” under the Convention 
became an ongoing concern for the Tribunal.  
 
Ultimately, the question to be answered is what is the appropriate way to define 
“protected groups” under the 1948 Genocide Convention, and how will this definition 
impact proceedings before the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).  By analyzing the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR, the accompanying jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and academic commentary, this 
article will explore the issue of protected groups.  More specifically, the four terms used 
in the Convention will be analyzed, followed by a discussion on the use of an objective 
or subjective approach to defining genocide.  Although ICTR case law tends not to be as 
well-reasoned as much of the ICTY case law, the former is still significant and may 
more accurately represent the ongoing debate regarding the precise and appropriate 
meaning of the terms found in the Convention.  
 
The world turned a blind eye to Rwanda in 1994.  As Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, 
“[f]or us, genocide was the gas chamber - what happened in Germany.  We were not 
able to realize that with the machete you can create a genocide.”6  The experience in 
Rwanda and the jurisprudence of the ICTR will forever shape notions of genocide at 
international law and will hopefully protect groups like the Tutsi of Rwanda from such 
atrocities in the future.  
 
                                                 
4 Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (4 September 1998) at para. 16 (International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber 2), online: ICTR <http://ictr.org> [Kambanda]. 
5 William Schabas, “Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda” (2000) 6 J. Int’l & Comp. L. 375 at 386. 
6 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Front-line Interview (PBS) (January 21, 2004). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
1. Rwanda and the Genocide 
On April 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed when his 
plane was shot down outside of Kigali.  The ensuing undercurrent of ethnic conflict rose 
very quickly, and a campaign for the systematic elimination of the Tutsi population 
began.  Over the next three months, approximately 800 000 Rwandans died, with five 
times the number of murders per day than were carried out in Nazi death camps.7  The 
daily death rate in April and May averaged 11 500, sometimes surging as high as 45 
000.8  The history behind this atrocity is far from unique, and demonstrates how easily 
the worst side of humanity can emerge.  
 
Hutu and Tutsi make up the two major “ethnic” groups in Rwanda.  The divide 
between these two groups was traditionally based on economics, as the majority Hutu 
farmed the land and the minority Tutsi raised cattle.9  Prior to colonization, the Tutsi 
controlled the country through a caste system.  Movement between the two groups was 
fluid, through marriage or economic prosperity or downturn.  During the colonial 
period, under both German and Dutch rule, this divide was strengthened and 
exploited.  The colonizers encouraged the historical myth of difference and proposed a 
“scientific” racial theory. This theory, which eventually became part of the official 
history of Rwanda, asserted that the Tutsi were a Nilo-Hamitic race from Egypt and 
Ethiopia who naturally ruled over the Bantu Hutu population from south and central 
Africa.10   
 
When the Dutch left Rwanda in 1959, their system of identity cards was maintained, 
identifying carriers as either Hutu or Tutsi based on the “scientific” methods of 
identification.11  During decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, a revolution marked the 
slaughter of 10 000 Tutsi as the Hutu majority took control under the First Republic.  As 
                                                 
7 Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda (Cavendish UK: Rutledge, 2001) at 247. 
8 Ibid. at 247. 
9 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 109. 
10 Alexandra Miller, “From the ICTR to the ICC: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include Rape” (2003) 108:1 Penn. St. 
L. Rev. 349 at 352. 
11 Supra note 4 at 379. 
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well as those dead, an estimated 270 000 - 370 000 Tutsi had fled to neighbouring 
countries.12  Major-General Habyarimana gained control of Rwanda and ruled until his 
death in 1994.  
  
On October 1, 1990, a group of Tutsi refugees known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) invaded northern Rwanda from a refugee camp in southern Uganda.  The Arusha 
Accords, signed in 1993, responded to this invasion through provisions for shared 
military and civilian power.  By this time though, the seeds were planted for the 
genocide.  The extremist Hutu Mouvement Revolutionnarie National pour le 
Developpement (MRND), led by President Habyarimana, held power and was already 
forming the Interahamwe, a youth militia.  With the death of the President in 1994, the 
MRND’s genocidal plan was formally implemented.  In one hundred days, over 800 000 
Tutsi and moderate Hutu were slaughtered; up to 500 000 women were raped; and, up 
to 100 000 children were left orphaned.13  
 
2. Genocide at International Law 
In 1943 Raphael Lemkin, outraged at the recent history of Jewish persecution and prior 
to that, the persecution of the Armenians, coined the term “genocide.”  He included a 
definition, as well as a significant discussion on prevention, in his seminal book, Axis 
Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for 
Redress, in 1944.14  He defined genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group,”15 and he called for the development of “provisions protecting minority groups 
from oppression because of their nationhood, religion or race.”16 
 
On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted General 
Assembly Resolution 96(1), which explicitly recognized genocide as an international 
crime.17  The resolution stated, “[g]enocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire 
human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human 
                                                 
12 Supra note 7 at 247. 
13 Survivor’s Fund Statistics, online: <http://survivors-fund.org.uk>.  
14 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, 2005). 
15 Ibid. at 80. 
16 Ibid. at 92. 
17 The Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 96(I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., 188-189. 
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beings.”18  However, even following the passing of General Assembly Resolution 96(1), 
both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals labeled the extermination of the Jewish 
population and other ethnic or religious minorities as persecution, rather than 
genocide.19 
 
In 1948, the world came together to sign the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide.  Currently, the Convention has 141 party states.  It defines 
genocide as:  
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.20  
The Convention also identifies a number of inchoate crimes as punishable acts.21  No 
immunity is granted for public officials.22   
 
In 1961, the first individual was convicted of the crime of genocide: Adolf Eichmann 
was convicted in an Israeli court of genocide under Israeli law, for crimes committed 
during World War II.  It was not until the creation of the ad hoc tribunals in 1993 and 
1994 that the crime of genocide was actually put forward before an international 
criminal court.  
 
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
On November 8, 1994, the Security Council of the United Nations, under Chapter VII, 
                                                 
18 Ibid.  
19 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 127. 
20 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), article 2 [Genocide Convention].  
21 Ibid., article 3. 
22 Ibid., article 4. 
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passed Resolution 955(1994) creating an international tribunal  
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in 
the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994.23  
The ICTR was given jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes occurring in Rwanda or by Rwandans in surrounding countries in 1994.24  
The purpose of the Tribunal was to contribute to national reconciliation while also 
contributing to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the Great Lakes Region.25  
Finally, the Tribunal was to assist in ending (and seeking redress through the 
prosecution of those persons responsible for) genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.26 
 
The ICTR was the first international court to try an offender for genocide, and “the 
ICTR remains the international criminal jurisdiction with the most elaborate case law on 
the crime of genocide.”27  The Trial Chamber in Akayesu was faced with the task of 
interpreting a convention written fifty years prior, with no guidance from any 
international jurisprudence; its decision marked an important point in the development 
of the international law of genocide.  Jean-Paul Akayesu was convicted on  September 2, 
1998, of genocide, crimes against humanity, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, and in October of that year, was sentenced to life imprisonment.28  Since this 
first trial, the ICTR has tried fifty individuals on charges of genocide, with another 
twenty-four cases currently underway.29  
 
In order to effectively interpret and apply the law of genocide, the ICTR has taken a 
                                                 
23 Establishment of an International Tribunal and Adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal SC Res. 955 UN SCOR, 1994, UN Doc. 
S/RES/955 at para. 1. 
24 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. 
25 Supra note 23. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Claus Kreb, “The Crime of Genocide Under International Law” (2006) 6 Int’l Crim L. Rev. 461 at 467. 
28 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence (2 October 1998) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Trial Chamber 1), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org>.  
29 Online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org>.   
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number of jurisprudential approaches.  The Tribunal depended heavily upon 
preparatory documents of the 1948 Genocide Convention.30  As the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties stipulates, “recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty,” may be used to supplement 
interpretation of treaties.31  The ICTR treated this provision as empowering it to use of 
the preparatory documents of the Convention as an interpretation tool for its own 
statute.  This technique guided much of the jurisprudence.  
 
II. SPECIAL INTENT 
 
What elevates the enumerated acts listed in the Convention to genocide is the special 
intent that the crime requires; it is what makes genocide the “crime of crimes.”32  The 
common law concept of special intent corresponds with the dol special or dolus specialis 
of Romano-Germanic systems.33  The special intent of genocide lies in the intent to 
destroy a protected group through one of the prohibited acts.  Put simply, it is the 
intention to achieve a specific result that is prohibited by the Convention, and therefore 
by the Statute of the ICTR. 
 
This added mental element is what translates the active elements of the crime into 
genocide.  As Schabas points out, “a specific intent offence requires performance of the 
actus reus but in association with an intent or purpose that goes beyond the mere 
performance of the act.”34  The ICTR in Kayishema and Ruzindana decided that this 
special intent must have been formed prior to the commission of the act.35  Although the 
special intent must be formed prior to the genocidal acts, there is no requirement of 
premeditation for the individual acts.36  
 
                                                 
30 William Schabas, The United Nations International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 95. 
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Article 32.  
32 George Mugwanya, The Crime of Genocide at International Law: Appraising the Contribution of the UN Tribunal for Rwanda 
(London: Cameron May Ltd., 2007) at 130. 
33 Supra note 9 at 217. 
34 Ibid. at 218.  
35 Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1, Judgment and Sentence (21 May 1999) at para. 91 
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org> [Kayishema  
and Ruzindana].  
36 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 3rd ed. (Cavendish UK: Routledge, 2007) at 144. 
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Establishing special intent has been one of the most difficult problems that the ICTR has 
had to grapple with.  Objectively determining the subjective understanding of a 
perpetrator has proven extremely onerous.  Some have argued that the ICTR did not 
adhere to this high standard for special intent.37  This allegation was largely a result of 
the difficulty in proving the subjective intention without accompanying material proof.  
In Rutaganda, the ICTR Appeals Chamber determined that the special intent could be 
inferred from relevant facts and circumstantial evidence in order “to [prevent] 
perpetrators from escaping convictions simply because such manifestations (of special 
intent) are absent.”38  This finding has many interesting implications for the 
responsibilities of both the prosecution and defence regarding the proving of special 
intent.  
 
III. PROTECTED GROUPS 
 
1. Group Victim  
The “depersonalization of the victim” is one of the most important aspects of genocide; 
genocide is not a crime against just the individual but, rather, a crime against the 
group.39  In Krstic, the ICTY contrasted genocide with persecution and focused on the 
fact that the victim in genocide is the group, whereas in persecution, it is the 
individual.40  In genocide, “the victimization of the group members in their individual 
capacities takes second place.”41  
 
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber argued that the group and the individual are joint 
victims, as the act victimizes the individual, but, because of the special intent, the 
victimization extends to the group as a whole.42  In Rutaganda, though, the Trial 
Chamber agreed with the assertion that the group was in fact the ultimate victim of 
                                                 
37 L.J. van den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law (Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 121. 
38 Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Appeal on Judgment (26 May 2003) at 525 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org>.  
39 Supra note 19 at 137.  
40 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (Srebrenica-Drina Corps), IT-98-33, Trial Judgment (2 August 2001) at para. 553 (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org> [Krstic].  
41 Supra note 36 at 139. 
42 Nin Jorgensen, “The Definition of Genocide: Joining the Dots in the Light of Recent Practice” (2001) 1 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 285 
at 304.  
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genocide.43  This latter position articulates the preferable view, as the general intent 
element affects the individual, but the special intent – the element that makes genocide 
genocide – is what victimizes the group.  Genocide is a crime against a group and 
therefore the victim is the group as a whole.  
 
As genocide is a crime with a group as its victim, it is essential to identify who 
constitutes a protected group.  According to traditional treaty interpretation principles, 
a protected group must fall under one of the four enumerated groups: national, 
ethnical, racial or religious groups.  This approach was problematic for the ICTR Trial 
Chambers: the Tutsi of Rwanda did not clearly fit into any of the four enumerated 
groups.44  But, if the Tutsi do not form a group that was intended to be protected, then 
who does?   
 
ICTR jurisprudence suggests two main issues to be determined in defining the 
protected groups under the 1948 Genocide Convention and the ICTR Statute.  The first 
issue is defining what was intended by the four enumerated terms.  The second issue is 
whether an objective or subjective approach should be taken in identifying these 
groups.  Interestingly, the ICTR now generally satisfies this element by taking judicial 
notice of the fact that in Rwanda in 1994 the Tutsi were recognized as an ethnic group.45  
Nevertheless, looking forward to the work of the ICC, it is clear that the task of 
understanding and interpreting these terms will be essential for the effective 
functioning of the Court. 
 
2. Determining the Protected Groups 
Seriatim Construction 
Treating the ICTR Statutes as a direct implementation of the 1948 Genocide Convention 
would theoretically bind the chambers to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
Article 31 of that Convention states: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
                                                 
43 Prosecutor v. George Rutaganada, ITTR-96-3, Trial Judgment (6 December 1999) at para. 59 (International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, Trial Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org> [Rutaganda].   
44 Supra note 10 at 360.  
45 Supra note 30 at 168. 
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context and in the light of it object and purpose.”46  The ordinary meaning seems 
obvious – the Genocide Convention is worded in a way that protects four enumerated 
groups: national, ethnical, racial or religious peoples.  It does not invite application of 
what could be called analogous reasoning to find other non-enumerated groups.47  This 
contrasts to General Assembly Resolution 96(I) that included “other groups” in its 
definition of genocide.48  
 
If the four enumerated groups are treated as an exhaustive list, then it is important to 
determine a functional definition for each.  Perhaps it is at this stage that the ICTR Trial 
Chamber in Akayesu erred.  As Schabas points out, “[i]n attempting to impose 
contemporary usage on [terms] whose meaning was different in 1948, it has the curious 
result of narrowing the Convention’s scope.”49  Looking to Raphael Lemkin’s writings, 
“national” had a much more broad scope in 1948, corresponding to the concept of 
“minority” or “national minority,” which, according to Schabas, could theoretically be 
broad enough to encompass racial, ethnic, and religious groups.50  Although treaty 
interpretation requires the ordinary meaning of the terms to guide the interpretation, 
language usage changes.  Looking to the usage of such terms at the time of drafting 
becomes imperative in properly interpreting the treaty.  If this had been done by the 
ICTR, then the problem of fitting the Tutsi into a box would not have occurred.  
Looking to the 1948 usage, the Tutsi could have been defined as national (as a national 
minority), racial (which included both physical and cultural characteristics), and 
ethnical (synonymous with both racial and national) groups.51  Each of these terms has 
been narrowed over the past fifty years, but it was the broader interpretation that was 
intended by the drafters of the Convention and that should guide tribunals in genocide 
trials.  
 
Although taking a seriatim approach is the norm at international law, it also has its 
faults in relation to the Genocide Convention.  The ICTR took the approach in Akayesu 
                                                 
46 Supra note 31 at article 31(1). 
47 Supra note 9 at 102. 
48 Supra note 17.  
49 Supra note 9 at 118. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. at 120-125. 
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that the enumerated groups were too restrictive.52  Rutaganda noted the problem that 
there is no internationally recognized, objective definition of these four terms, in either 
1948 or now.53  Although the intentions of the drafters are one aspect to be looked at in 
the interpretation, by aligning this approach with the ordinary meaning interpretation 
doctrine, it freezes the Convention in time.  Using today’s interpretations of the terms 
would actually narrow the definition, which is also unacceptable.  Thus, by limiting the 
notion of protection to a seriatim construction, the Convention would either be frozen in 
time or be limited beyond the intentions of the drafters, neither of which should be 
encouraged by international law. The ICTR was therefore correct in rejecting an 
exclusive approach to the interpretation of the 1948 Convention.  
 
Stable and Permanent by Birth 
As was discussed above, one of the major problems faced by the Trial Chamber in 
Akayesu was that the enumerated groups appeared to exclude the Tutsi from protection 
by the Convention.  In an attempt to remedy this dilemma, the Trial Chamber looked to 
the preparatory works of the Convention and determined that the drafters had intended 
to include all stable and permanent groups whose membership was determined by 
birth.54  Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows reference to 
preparatory work of a treaty to  
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or 
to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to 
Article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.55 
It could be argued that in determining the definition of protected groups, time and 
location had changed the definition, leaving the preparatory works available under sub-
section (a).  Alternatively, the exclusion of the Tutsi as a protected group under a 
seriatim approach could be seen to be “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” and 
therefore would leave the preparatory documents available under sub-section (b).  
 
                                                 
52 Supra note 2 at para. 516. 
53 Supra note 43 at 56; supra note 37 at 130.  
54 Supra note 2 at para. 511. 
55 Supra note 31. 
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In assessing the preparatory documents, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu determined that,  
the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only 
“stable” groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and 
membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of 
the more “mobile” groups which one joins though individual 
voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. 
Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups protected 
by the Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups 
would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who 
belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often 
irremediable manner.56 
This “stable and permanent, by birth” assessment would protect the Tutsi under the 
Convention. 
 
The decision in Akayesu, although based on acceptable international interpretation 
methods, has been much criticized and generally not applied in subsequent 
jurisprudence.  Most notably, in Kayishema and Ruzindana, the Trial Chamber accepted 
the qualification of the Tutsi as an “ethnic group,” a characterization that has since been 
accepted through judicial notice in other cases.57  Defining the Tutsi as an enumerated, 
protected group removed the need to expand the definition to include all “stable and 
permanent, by birth” groups.  What is puzzling is that, in Akayesu, the Trial Chamber 
convicted the accused of crimes against humanity based on ethnic grounds.58  By taking 
a more purposive approach to defining the protected groups, there was no need to 
resort to the supplementary interpretation methods. 
 
One of the most obvious problems with the Akayesu extension is that only one of the 
four enumerated terms is truly “stable and permanent, by birth.”  Even with a limited 
definition of the four groups, racial groups are the only group that is manifestly 
impossible to change and determined from birth.  Furthermore, this definition of “stable 
and permanent” is in direct contradiction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
                                                 
56 Supra note 2 at para. 511. 
57 Supra note 35 at para. 291. 
58 Supra note 2 at para. 652. 
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Article 15(2) gives everyone the right to have a nationality and change it if they so 
choose.59  Article 18 gives everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion and the freedom to change his religion or belief.60  Ethnicity, like religion and 
nationality, may be a choice made by individuals in relation to their culture and 
language.  Generally it is taken from one’s parents, but a choice may exist in identifying 
with a given ethnic group.  Defining the protected groups as only those that are “stable 
and permanent, by birth” inherently contradicts the words of the Genocide Convention 
and has the potential to remove three of the four enumerated groups from protection.  
 
There has also been criticism of the interpretation techniques of the Trial Chamber. 
Relying on the preparatory documents of the Convention, the Chamber fleshed out the 
intentions of the drafters in determining the groups intended to be protected. The 
problem is that the purpose of the interpretation methods is to clarify ambiguous or 
obscure terms or those that are manifestly absurd or unreasonable, not add elements 
that were not included in the Convention. Had the intention been to protect all stable 
and permanent groups determined by birth, then the Convention should have read as 
such.  The approach in Akayesu quite obviously broadens the definition of protected 
group under the Convention.  The use of preparatory documents should be restricted to 
clarification rather than expansion.  
 
The expansion of the definition also creates a significant problem because of the nature 
of the offence.  Schabas points out that “reading in terms that are not already present in 
the text is also particularly objectionable when the treaty define[s] a criminal offence, 
which should be subject to restrictive interpretation and respect the rule nullum crimen 
sine lege.”61  A crime should be defined in an explicit way and should not be expanded 
arbitrarily.  In many ways, the definition that was endorsed in Akayesu defines the crime 
of genocide so broadly as to “risk trivializing the horror of the real crime when it is 
committed.”62  
 
Defining protected groups as “all groups that are stable and permanent and whose 
                                                 
59 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), article 15(2). 
60 Ibid. at article 18. 
61 Supra note 9 at 132.  
62 Supra note 4 at 387. 
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membership is determined by birth” is an unjustified broadening of the protected 
groups under the 1948 Genocide Convention.  The broadening of the definition by 
reliance on a favourable reading of preparatory documents was performed in order to 
ensure that the Tutsi of Rwanda did, in fact, fit into the protected groups.  However, 
categorizing the Tutsi as a protected group could have been accomplished in a number 
of other, more acceptable ways, including a more purposive reading of the enumerated 
groups.  “[The Akayesu decision] quite brazenly goes beyond the actual terms of the 
Convention definition, invoking the intent of the drafters as a justification.”63  
 
Ensemble Construction 
The ensemble approach to interpreting the list of protected groups focuses on one 
group that is characterized by one or more of the four terms listed in the Convention.64  
The enumerated terms are seen as adjectives describing one thing, rather then as four 
separate and unique groups.  Most notably, Schabas and the ICTY in Krstic have 
espoused this approach.  A purposive interpretation of the protected groups is 
preferred over a deconstructive interpretation according to the ensemble approach.  The 
result is that “the four terms in the Convention not only overlap, they also help to define 
each other, operating much as four corner posts that delimit an area within which a 
myriad of groups covered by the Convention find protection.”65 
 
Schabas looks to the preparatory documents of the Convention as well, although with a 
very different reading than in Akayesu.  The approach also focuses on a historical 
understanding in order to determine the object and purpose of the Convention.66  This 
historical analysis begins with Raphael Lemkin’s writings.  According to Schabas, 
Lemkin’s writings  
indicate he conceived of the repression of genocide within the 
context of the protection of what were then called “national 
minorities”. Use of terms such as “ethnic”, “racial” or “religious” 
merely flesh out the idea, without at all changing its essential 
                                                 
63 Supra note 4 at 380. 
64 Supra note 37 at 133. 
65 Supra note 9 at 111. 
66 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” 
 Protected Groups in Law of Genocide Vol. 1 40 
content.67 
Lemkin was, arguably, intending to protect the national minorities that had, until then, 
been the targets of such campaigns.  
 
Beyond Lemkin’s pioneering writings, it is also important to find grounding for an 
ensemble approach in the actual Convention.  The ensemble construction interprets the 
four groups as something different than a list; the four terms overlap and help to define 
each other, in opposition to the seriatim construction discussed earlier.  Although not 
the “ordinary meaning” that comes to mind, this interpretation also relies on the 
“ordinary meaning” of the terms.  Often, a racial and ethnical group constitute the same 
people, religious and ethnical the same, national and religious the same.  These terms 
are so intimately related that seeing them as individual, separate, and distinct terms is a 
false construction of the words.  Arguably, the intentions of the drafters were to see 
these terms in a “dynamic and synergistic relationship, each contributing to the 
construction of the other.”68  The terms, when taken together, convey a meaning, 
protecting groups like those that had been targeted in the then recent history.  
 
Applying this doctrine to the events of the 1990s, in Krstic, the ICTY adopted a similar 
approach to that of Schabas: 
The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such 
a list was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly 
corresponding to what was recognized, before the [S]econd [W]orld 
[W]ar, as “national minorities”, rather than to refer to several 
distinct prototypes of human groups.69  
The Trial Chamber looked to the fact that some terms were included early on and other 
terms later in order to clarify what types of groups were intended to be protected.70  An 
example of this is the inclusion of “ethnical” to ensure that “national” would not be 
understood as including purely political groups.  The ICTY determined that to attempt 
to differentiate between the four terms and to give each an objective definition and 
corresponding criteria would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
                                                 
67 Supra note 9 at 105.  
68 Ibid. at 112. 
69 Supra note 40 at para. 556. 
70 Ibid. at para. 555. 
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Convention.  As has been previously discussed, the words of a treaty must be given their 
ordinary meaning consistent with the object and purpose, which the ICTY clearly 
attempted to do and, arguably, succeeded in doing.  
 
The result of this approach to the groups protected under the 1948 Genocide Convention 
is more restrictive than the “stable and permanent, by birth” approach while being 
more broad than the seriatim construction.  One key benefit of an ensemble 
construction over the seriatim construction is that gaps between the terms cannot occur.  
The four terms create the edges of a net, which is then able to catch other groups that 
may not fit specifically into one of the terms defined individually, as is done in the 
seriatim approach.  Although this approach may result in a “we know what was 
intended on being protected and we will tell you when we see it” tactic, it is much 
better than having events such as those in Rwanda slip through because they do not 
easily fit into a conceptual box. Furthermore, there is a danger that searching for 
autonomous meanings for the four terms will “weaken the overarching sense of the 
enumeration as a whole, forcing the jurist into an untenable Procrustes bed.”71 
 
The “stable and permanent, by birth” approach also contrasts with the ensemble 
construction.  These approaches have many similarities in interpretive reasoning: both 
approaches look to the preparatory documents of the Convention, as well as the purpose 
and objective of the Convention.  They have also both found support from within 
international criminal jurisprudence.  The most obvious difference between the 
approaches is in their support from the academic community and support in future 
international decisions.  The approach taken by the ICTR in Akayesu, although not 
explicitly rejected, has not been followed by other decisions, including others at the 
ICTR.  The approach broadens the protected group to an untenable point.  Not only 
does it make the group difficult to distinguish, more problematically, it possibly leaves 
out some of the groups explicitly enumerated in the Convention.  On the other hand, an 
ensemble construction broadens the protected group beyond the narrow seriatim 
construction but finds its grounding in the four listed terms.  It uses the terms to 
demarcate a boundary of protection.  
                                                 
71 Supra note 4 at 386. 
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Like the Akayesu approach, the ensemble approach falters on predictability, but this 
may be an acceptable outcome.  It took fifty years from the creation of the Convention for 
the first international trial of genocide to take place from the creation of the Convention; 
this delay demonstrates the expanse of time that the Convention must be able to deal 
with.  It needs to be interpreted in a way that can grow with world realities.  Using the 
ensemble construction prevents the Convention from becoming a relic of the past, 
maintaining its relevancy. Although predictability is important, the Convention may 
require some ambiguity in order to protect groups that may not fit into some artificial 
box.  
 
The ensemble construction looks to the protected groups as one entity.  Had this 
approach been applied by the ICTR, then there would have been no debate about 
whether the Tutsi were a protected group.  Although not fitting the objective criteria of 
ethnical or racial per se, the meaning of the terms taken together definitively covers the 
Tutsi population.  This more holistic approach respects the terms of the Convention 
while also respecting the realities of the world and the impossibilities of fitting groups 
into restrictive categories.  
  
3. Definition Perspective 
Defining the group(s) protected by the 1948 Genocide Convention can occur from two 
perspectives, or a combination of both.  An objective approach gives definite criteria for 
the terms listed in the Convention.  A subjective approach takes into account the 
perspective of the community, the victim(s) and/or the accused.  The problem that 
arises is that under the Convention, there is no guidance as to whether membership of a 
group is an objective factor or if perception of membership is crucial.72 
 
Objective Perspective 
In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial Chamber undertook the monumental task of defining the 
four groups listed in the Convention.73  The purpose was to create objective criteria 
through which a protected group could be identified.  The Chamber sought to give each 
                                                 
72 Supra note 36 at 145. 
73 Supra note 2 at paras. 512-515. 
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term its own definition: a “national group” being “a collection of people who are 
perceived to share a legal bind of common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of 
rights and duties”;74 an “ethnic group” as a “group whose members share a common 
language or culture”;75 a “racial group” as a group “based on hereditary physical traits 
often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national 
or religious factors”;76 and a “religious group” as a group “whose members share the 
same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”77  Interestingly, “national group” has 
a subjective element included; the other three terms are clearly defined in objective 
terms, allowing groups to be easily identified as either belonging to the Convention’s 
protected groups, or not.  
 
An objective analysis has one very important benefit: groups are easily identified by set 
criteria.  An analysis will not have to delve into the same depth of anthropological and 
sociological data that is required with a subjective approach.  Objective criteria create 
greater stability, consistency, and predictability in the application of the Genocide 
Convention.  
 
One major concern regarding a purely objective approach is its lack of flexibility, as was 
clearly demonstrated in Akayesu.  The objective criteria that the Trial Chamber set out 
did not cover the Tutsi under any of the enumerated heads, even though the people of 
Rwanda recognized the Hutu and Tutsi as being distinctive ethnic groups.  The “fix” 
that was proposed was to give an “expansive interpretation of the expression.”78  The 
objective approach was unable to deal with the realities of the community by giving 
definitive criteria to be met for protection.  
 
Even more difficulty arises in trying to establish the objective criteria that should be 
used for each of the terms. There is no consensus internationally on the definition of the 
terms, or on how each group should be measured against the term.79  Although the Trial 
Chamber in Akayesu did a thorough analysis of the definitions of the terms, at least one 
                                                 
74 Ibid. at para. 512. 
75 Ibid. at para. 513 
76 Ibid. at para. 514 
77 Ibid. at para. 515. 
78 Supra note 30 at 168.  
79 See Rutaganda, supra note 42 at para. 56. 
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understanding of the word “ethnical” was not included - the local, Rwandan 
understanding.  In Jelisic, the ICTY stated,  
to attempt to define a national, ethnical or racial group today using 
objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a 
perilous exercise whose result would not necessarily correspond to 
the perception of the persons concerned by such categorisation.80 
An absence of this understanding proved to be a significant hurdle for the Akayesu 
Chamber.  Usages of certain language in international treaties may always be difficult, 
but in a case such as this, a limited, objective analysis could prove fatal to the Convention 
as a whole.  An objective perspective does not adequately suffice in establishing the 
special intent of genocide.  
 
Subjective Perspective 
In Kayishema and Ruzindana, a different ICTR trial chamber adopted a purely subjective 
approach, noting that an ethnic group could be “a group identified as such by others, 
including perpetrators of the crimes.”81  Furthermore, because of the subjective 
approach, the Chamber was able to find that the Tutsi were an ethnic group, based on 
the use of official identity cards identifying them as such.82  The use of a subjective 
approach manages some of the difficulties arising out of the objective criteria; 
importantly, it enables the use of local understandings of the terms.  In fact, the four 
listed terms require a degree of subjectivity because their meaning is inherently 
determined in a social context. 
 
There are a number of nuances that exist within the subjective approach.  The most 
important when it comes to determining the protected groups is whether the subjective 
analysis should be done from the perspective of the victim, the community, the 
perpetrator, or a combination of these.  In Bagilishema, the perpetrator’s appeared to be 
the most important perspective: “if a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as 
belonging to a protected group, the victim should be considered by the Chamber as a 
                                                 
80 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (Brcko), IT-95-10, Judgment (14 December 1999) at para. 70 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org> [Jelisic].  
81 Supra note 35 at para. 98. 
82 Ibid. at para. 523. 
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member of the protected group, for the purposes of genocide.”83  At some level, this 
makes sense, as the special intent required must be that of the perpetrator.  The ICTY 
has also advanced this reasoning in Jelisic.84 
 
It is important to take into account the perspectives of the individual victim of the act, 
the group victim, and the community as a whole, as well.  As was stated from the outset 
of the ICTR’s existence, reconciliation is one of the key goals of the Tribunal.  
Recognizing the perspective of the victims and the community will assist in the healing 
process.  Allowing the victims and the communities to play a role in group 
identification is as important as the perpetrator’s perspective, but for very different 
reasons.  
 
In practice, the subjective approach may come down to using all three of the 
perspectives identified.  Cassese has created a two-step analysis here: first, were the 
people treated as belonging to one of the protected groups (community and perpetrator 
perspective); and second, did they consider themselves as belonging to one of the 
protected groups (victim perspective).85  At the ICTR, this approach was identified in 
Rutaganda as being appropriate in some instances.  
[T]he Chamber notes that for the purposes of applying the Genocide 
Convention, membership of a group is, in essence, a subjective 
rather than an objective concept.  The victim is perceived by the 
perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated for 
destruction. In some instances, the victim may perceive 
himself/herself as belonging to the said group.86 
 
There are also concerns with a purely subjective approach.  Allowing individuals to 
determine the protected groups from a subjective perspective has the potential to 
extend the protection to abstract groups.87  The drafters of the Convention intended to 
                                                 
83 Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment (7 June 2001) at para. 65 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org> [Bagilishema].  
84 “[I]t is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial group from the point of view of those persons 
who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.” Jelisic, supra note 80 at para. 70.  
85 Supra note 19 at 139. 
86 Supra note 43 at 56. 
87 See Mugwanya, supra note 32 at 73. 
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protect a certain type of group.  Although there has been much discussion about what 
this group includes, it is clear that it is not boundless.  Allowing a purely subjective 
approach could create a limitless number of protected groups.  Schabas states, “[t]he 
flaw is allowing, at least in theory, genocide to be committed against a group that does 
not have any real objective existence.”88  Kreb has gone even further, stating that,  
a subjective approach would not only circumvent the drafters’ 
decision to confine the protection of certain groups, but would 
convert the crime of genocide to an unspecific crime of group 
destruction based on a discriminatory motive.89 
Another criticism is that subjective analysis allows the perpetrator to define his own 
crime.90  The law cannot permit a crime to be defined by offender alone.  However, 
including the perspective of the community and the victim would show some 
consensus on the existence of a protected group.  
 
A subjective analysis of whether a group is protected allows for the social, cultural, and 
political realities of a community to be considered.  It also creates some difficulties in 
determining the groups intended to be protected by the 1948 Genocide Convention.  By 
including some element of a subjective analysis, though, it ensures a more pragmatic 
perspective of the crime. 
 
Combined Perspective 
Mugwanya argues that, when faced with the reality of present day conflicts where there 
is an interrelationship and overlap between many of the terms, a failure to consider 
both objective and subjective approaches could create absurd results, as could have 
arguably happened in Rwanda.91  The objective criteria help to define the groups from 
the international perspective, while the subjective component recognizes that 
membership is often a product of local social or political construction.  
 
The balance to be met between the two approaches is complicated.  Van den Herik sees 
                                                 
88 Supra note 9 at 110. 
89 Supra note 27 at 474. 
90 See Schabas, supra note 9; see also van den Herik, supra note 37. 
91 Supra note 32 at 84.  
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the objective approach as being purely complimentary.92  Jorgensen, on the other hand, 
argues that the group must be defined objectively before delving into the subjective, 
because of a risk of getting lost amongst the subjective elements.93  Reaching this 
balance is the key to creating an effective analysis.  One approach is to proceed on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account the evidence offered, and the context of the 
community, both culturally and politically.  This approach does not create a law that is 
predictable in its application, but it is probably the best approach in order to respect the 
purpose and objective of the Convention.  Each analysis should include both modes, 
allowing the local perspective to work alongside international perspectives.  
 
The ICTR has generally followed a combination approach in determining the protected 
groups.  The approach taken varies with the case, as well as with the individual Trial 
Chamber.  In general though, the Trial Chambers have adopted a blending of the two 
from the outset of the analysis.  The analysis starts from a reference to the objective 
particulars, moving on to the subjective perspective, most commonly of the 
perpetrator.94 
 
There are some criticisms, however.  First is the obvious exclusion in the subjective 
aspect of the experience of the community as a whole and the group victim, as well as 
the individual victim.  In Kajelijeli, the Trial Chamber expressly stated that the victims 
either had to belong to the group objectively, or the perpetrator had to believe that the 
victims belonged to the group that he targeted.95  Further, a case-by-case analysis could 
create a requirement for excessive, repetitive analysis.  If it is the same group of people, 
once they have been identified as a protected group at that time, should they not 
continue to be a protected group for the purposes of the Convention?  It is important to 
prove that the perpetrator targeted the individual victims because of their membership 
in that group, but there is no need to reprove that the group is a protected group for 
every case.  
 
                                                 
92 Supra note 37 at 135 
93 Supra note 40 at 289. 
94 Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 173. 
95 Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A, Judgment (1 December 2003) at para. 813 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chambers), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org> [Kajelijeli]. 
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Although there is concern surrounding each of the perspectives, the combination 
approach allows for the benefits to most heavily outweigh the concerns.  The best 
balance is reached if the two are used from the beginning of the analysis in a 
complementary way.  Balancing the objective and subjective perspectives creates a more 
holistic understanding of the protected groups.  The objective respects the intentions of 
the drafters of the Convention, while the subjective respects the experience and cultural 
understandings of the community.  
 
IV. EFFECT OF THE ICTR ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The ICTR was the first international criminal court to hear a case of genocide and the 
first to convict an individual of genocide.  Currently, it has heard the greatest number of 
genocide charges of any international tribunal.  The ICC must be sure to consider the 
findings of the ICTR in cases of genocide.  
 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute reproduces, word for word, Article II of the Genocide 
Convention (as did the ICTR Statute).96  The criteria for a protected group under ICC 
jurisdiction are the same as the criteria under ICTR jurisdiction.  The inchoate crimes 
have been removed under article 6 of the Rome Statute, but all except “conspiracy to 
commit” have been included elsewhere.97  In addition to Article 6, the Rome Statute 
includes the “Elements of Crimes,” which provides detailed descriptions of the 
elements of the three core crimes.  The “Elements” are not binding on the Court, but 
“shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application” of the crimes.98  
 
When it comes to interpreting the mental element of genocide, the ICC is in a similar 
place as the ICTR was at the beginning of its existence.  There is nothing more included 
in the Rome Statute, nor the Elements of Crimes, regarding the mental element of genocide 
and in particular the protected groups.  The ICC has the advantage of looking at 
applicable treaties, and may apply its previous decisions in any future proceedings.99  
The Court should also be able to use the decisions of the ICTR and ICTY as resources.  It 
                                                 
96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 6. 
97 Ibid., article 25. 
98 Ibid., article 9. 
99 Ibid., article 21(2). 
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is likely that the ICTR’s jurisprudence will impact the ICC in its analysis of genocide, as 
it is the same law that is being applied.  
 
1. Determining the Protected Groups 
The ICTR, in Akayesu, introduced the idea of “stable and permanent, by birth” as the 
criteria that should be applied to determine groups protected by the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.  The ICC will, in all likelihood, not follow this approach. It fails to 
adequately respect the choices made by the drafters of the Convention and arbitrarily 
expands the protected groups in a limitless way.  Trampling on accepted methods of 
interpretation, it ignores the ordinary meaning of the words used.  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that Article 22 of the Rome Statute explicitly states, “the definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.”100  
 
The conceptual competition between the ensemble and seriatim constructions is more 
significant.  The inclusion of Article 22  of the Rome Statute gives the seriatim 
construction the advantage, as it is a strict construction with no need for extension or 
analogy.  The ICTR failed to uphold the spirit of the Genocide Convention, as it identified 
a very narrow and time-specific definition of each group, ignoring the different and 
more inclusive meanings of 1948.  If the ICC takes the seriatim approach, then it must 
be sure to accept more holistic definitions of the terms than was done by the ICTR, in 
order to ensure that groups such as the Tutsi are included in the protected groups.  
 
Ideally, the ICC will accept the ensemble construction, as it balances the drafters’ 
intentions with modern need.  Although not the understandings that initially come to 
mind, using the enumerated terms as adjectives is a completely acceptable usage, and in 
this case, the more appropriate.  This approach, taken by the ICTY, recognizes the 
interconnectedness of the four terms, and that, in practice, one often is unable to 
distinguish between them.  Groups that have similar criteria to the four enumerated 
terms are also protected.  There is no doubt the Tutsi of Rwanda have the similarities 
necessary to be protected.  
 
                                                 
100 Ibid., article 22. 
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The ICC should reject the approach taken in Akayesu and should use either the seriatim 
construction or the ensemble construction.  If the seriatim approach is chosen, a holistic 
approach to the definitions would best respect the purpose of the Convention.  
Nevertheless, the ensemble construction is most preferable, as it recognizes the 
interconnectedness of the four enumerated terms.  As was recognized by the ICTY, it is 
the approach that best reflects the history of the Convention as well as modern day 
necessities.  
 
2. Definition Perspective 
The ICTR appears to have settled on using both an objective and subjective analysis in 
determining the groups protected by the Genocide Convention.  The ICC will likely 
follow this.  The use of an objective criterion creates greater stability and consistency in 
the application of the Convention, which should be an important goal of the ICC.  Using 
an objective approach alone, though, does not respect cultural and social realities of 
peoples’ lives.  In 1994, asking an individual in Rwanda what their ethnicity was would 
yield one of three answers: Hutu, Tutsi or Batwa.  People understood themselves as 
belonging to an ethnic group.  A purely objective analysis fails to understand the 
complexities of a society such as that of Rwanda.  
 
A subjective approach, on the other hand, respects the experience of the members of the 
community.  It allows their understandings to be included in the criminal proceedings.  
Alone, though, it has the potential of protecting purely artificial groups.  The Genocide 
Convention protects a certain kind of group, and, whether it is just the four listed groups 
or an ensemble construction of these groups, there must be some objective component 
in order to respect the intentions of the drafters of the Convention.  A purely subjective 
approach also has the hazard of allowing the perpetrator alone to define the crime.  The 
subjective analysis encourages the domestic understanding to be included, but has the 
potential of making a farce out of the Convention. 
 
Together, the objective and the subjective analyses encourage respect for the ordinary 
meanings of the terms in the Convention, while respecting the experience of those 
involved in the incidents.  The ICC will need to define the relationship between the two 
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approaches.  The ICTY and ICTR have been far from consistent in dealing with this 
problem, and have approached the issue by encouraging a case-by-case analysis.  This is 
appropriate, so long as both the objective and subjective analyses are used in every case.  
Although this approach does not create complete predictability, it balances local with  
global considerations.  This result is what is most needed when it comes to defining the 
protected groups.  
 
Who should be protected under Article 6 of the Rome Statute?  The group should fit 
objectively into the net created by the four terms in the article, mirroring that created by 
Article 2 of the 1948 Genocide Convention.  Further, the subjective understanding of the 
victims, the perpetrator, and the community as a whole, must be taken into account 
while determining whether the group is caught by the Convention. The 
objective/subjective balance must be met on a case-by-case basis in order to give full 
value to the intentions of the drafters of the Convention.  There is no doubt that the 
experience of the ICTR jurisprudence will be invaluable to the ICC.  One of the most 
important contributions of the ICTR is to put into practice a fifty-year-old convention 




Genocide is a crime committed against a group victim.  The 1948 Genocide Convention 
was created in response to the atrocities committed against the Jewish people of Europe, 
but its application to subsequent brutalities has not been clear.  Both the ICTY and the 
ICTR were faced with interpreting this Convention.  One of the most important aspects 
of the law of genocide is determining what groups are to be protected.  This issue arose 
in the very first trial of the ICTR.  Further trials confronted the issue of whether the 
protected groups should be determined objectively or subjectively.  The effect of ICTR 
and ICTY jurisprudence on the future of the law of genocide and its administration at 
the ICC is still not certain.  
 
The case of the Rwandan Tutsi presented the international legal community with a 
difficult situation.  The group escaped easy classification, and the ICTR had to confront 
this problem.  The reality is that in our current world, most groups are more like the 
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Tutsi in 1994 than the Jewish during WWII.  Groups are an intersection of both true and 
artificial differences; they evade easy classification.  This does not mean, prima facie, that 
they will not be protected.  The interpretation of “protected groups” advocated within 
this article will protect groups like the Tutsi, who were targeted in the same way as the 
European Jewish community.  The 1948 Genocide Convention must be interpreted in a 
way that empowers the international community to prevent and protect, while 
upholding genocide as “the crime of crimes.” 
